Issue 03 · September 2026
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SWA Insight · September 2026 · Issue 03

Who is flying your contract: September’s lessons for risk owners.

A cargo 767 overran a runway at Miami, a firefighting helicopter was lost in Yosemite and a news helicopter in Los Angeles. Three accidents on contracted flights, and what risk owners should check now.

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In this issue

  1. 01This month at a glance
  2. 02Major accidents & incidents
  3. 03Regulatory & compliance
  4. 04Manufacturer & industry
  5. 05Safety data & trends
  6. 06What to ask your operators
  7. 07Spotlight
  8. 08Looking ahead
  9. 09What we've been up to
6 Sep21 Air flight 7598, a 767 cargo flight for Amazon, overran runway 30 at Miami
5people on the ground killed at Miami; both pilots survived
2fatal US helicopter accidents in the month, both on contracted flights
1,200 ftdistance the 767 came to rest beyond the paved runway (NTSB)
01

This month at a glance

The one-minute version.

September 2026 brought three fatal accidents on flights flown by one organisation for another. At Miami, a Boeing 767-33A cargo aircraft operated by 21 Air for Amazon overran runway 30 and struck two vehicles; five people on the ground were killed and both pilots survived. In California, an Airbus AS332 L1 working on the Dome Fire at Yosemite was lost with both pilots, and a news helicopter operated for two Los Angeles television stations was lost at Chatsworth with two people on board and one on the ground. The NTSB has determined no cause for any of them. Earlier events moved on: Kenya’s investigator published a preliminary report on the Mount Ololokwe EC130 B4 accident, and Germany’s BFU is investigating a Vietnam Airlines 787-9 at Munich. On the rules side, the FAA adopted a PC-24 windshield-heating directive and a landing gear support inspection for A320-family aircraft. The Spotlight asks what a contract owner can see of the operator it relies on.

02

Major accidents & incidents

Verified facts only. No speculation on cause.

Flat coastal airport runway end at dusk with a windsock streaming straight out and a thunderstorm anvil building, a perimeter road and fence in soft focus (no people, no aircraft, no vehicles)
Look at the wind before the approach, and at who is working near the runway end. (AI / illustrative only)

Boeing 767-33A, Miami, Florida, USA (6 September)

21 Air flight 7598, a cargo flight for Amazon from San Juan under Part 121, overran runway 30 at Miami after landing about 1353 local, struck a van on an airport perimeter road and an SUV outside the fence, and came to rest about 1,200 ft beyond the paved surface. Five people in the van were killed and three people on the ground were seriously injured; the two pilots had minor injuries. The NTSB preliminary report DCA26MA352 ↗ says the aircraft crossed the threshold at 177 kt, touched down about 3,750 ft along the runway at 160 kt, and that the speed brakes stayed stowed and the thrust reversers were not deployed. The controller cleared the flight to land without a wind report, which the NTSB notes is required when there is a tailwind. The investigation is continuing and no cause has been determined.

Airbus AS332 L1, Yosemite National Park, California, USA (20 September)

An AS332 L1 operated by Precision was lost while making water-bucket drops on the Dome Fire, and both pilots were killed. AVweb reports ↗ the accident occurred shortly before 3 pm southeast of Ostrander Lake, that the National Park Service had warned of poor smoke visibility the day before, and that it is not known whether visibility played a role. The FAA and NTSB are investigating and no cause has been determined.

Eurocopter AS350 B2, Chatsworth, California, USA (15 September)

An AS350 B2 operated by Angel City Air for NBC4 and Telemundo 52 was lost near Chatsworth while its crew was covering a separate road collision. AVweb reports ↗ that the pilot and an aerial journalist were killed along with one person on the ground, that two others were taken to hospital, and that the aircraft burned after striking an industrial area. The NTSB and FAA are investigating and no cause has been determined.

Airbus EC130 B4, Mount Ololokwe, Samburu County, Kenya (19 August; preliminary report 18 September)

Kenya’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Department ↗ has published its preliminary report. As reported by Capital FM ↗, flight-tracking data show the helicopter flying parallel to the cliff face, climbing above the ridgeline and starting a 180-degree left turn down the slope, during which a landing-gear skid struck a rock near the summit and the landing gear separated. The pilot had about 5,200 flying hours, about 3,450 of them on fixed-wing aircraft. All seven on board were killed. The investigators will examine weight and balance and review maintenance records, and the final report will set out the probable causes.

On the grapevine

Reported elsewhere, not yet independently verified by us. Status: pending validation — confirmed or dropped next edition.

Airbus A380, Munich, Germany (17 August)

A Lufthansa A380 was reported to have landed short of the threshold and struck approach lights, with no injuries reported. Details come from aviation news sites only. InsideFlyer ↗

Pending validation

How we use the terms. Accident, serious incident and incident are used as defined in ICAO Annex 13 ↗; occurrence is the umbrella term and the word we use while a classification is unsettled. The investigating authority’s classification prevails. We avoid “crash” and name no cause or fault while an investigation is open.

03

Regulatory & compliance

Rules, directives and decisions that change what you must do.

Close-up of a gloved hand holding a small solid-state relay module over a business-jet cockpit panel, windshield blurred behind
A directive sets the minimum. Ask how each modification is confirmed on your aircraft. (AI / illustrative only)

FAA adopts a PC-24 windshield-heating directive (AD 2026-17-11, effective 20 October)

AD 2026-17-11 ↗ follows EASA AD 2026-0008. A solid-state relay in the left windshield heating system can allow reverse current flow when off, which could stop the emergency windshield heat working after a dual generator failure and cost outside visibility. Operators of affected Pilatus PC-24 aircraft must modify the aircraft and replace the relay; the FAA estimates 168 aircraft on the US register.

Wind information on landing: what the NTSB cites

The Miami preliminary report cites FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, which requires controllers to state wind direction and speed when authorising a runway with a tailwind component. It is cited as a fact of the case, not a finding. NTSB preliminary report ↗

04

Manufacturer & industry

Fleet issues, directives and supplier news.

Inspector's torch and gauge on a landing gear support rib lug bore showing faint tool marks, aircraft belly blurred behind
Production defects can sit in new aircraft. Ask what your operator inspects at delivery and after. (AI / illustrative only)

Supplier production defects behind two Airbus structural directives

The FAA’s A320-family AD 2026-18-03 ↗ (effective 18 September) requires repeat inspections of main landing gear support rib 5 lug bores after tool marks from an improper supplier bushing-removal technique; it affects 29 US-registered aircraft, as summarised by Airways ↗, and follows EASA AD 2026-0142 ↗. The A350-1041 pylon fastener AD 2026-17-09 ↗ covers missing chamfers beneath critical fastener heads on 53 aircraft, none on the US register. Both trace to production, not service wear: ask what your operator checks on delivery and after maintenance by third parties.

05

Safety data & trends

What the numbers say — and their scope.

This month’s data section looks inside one event. The NTSB preliminary report on the Miami overrun gives recorded values, so the three charts show what investigators have published for that one flight. They are single-event figures and say nothing about how often such events occur.

Runway threshold177Touchdown160Wheel brakes on146Brakes off, go-around thrust120Brakes back on117Paved runway end113Struck approach lights100Last recorded65
Groundspeed (kt)

Groundspeed through the landing roll, flight 7598

knots
Source NTSB preliminary report DCA26MA352 (flight data recorder and ADS-B)
Scope One flight: 21 Air flight 7598, Boeing 767-33A, runway 30 at Miami on 6 September 2026. Values are as published in the preliminary report.
Period Final approach and landing roll, 6 September 2026
Note The report states the NTSB will refine the sequence in an aircraft performance study. Preliminary and subject to change; no cause has been determined.
7,267150Captain2,800800First officer
Total flight hoursHours on the 767

Crew flight experience, total and on the 767

flight hours
Source NTSB preliminary report DCA26MA352 (crew interviews)
Scope The two pilots of 21 Air flight 7598. Hours are self-reported in interviews and rounded as published. The captain received his 767 type rating on 18 May 2026 and was hired in April 2026; the first officer received his on 2 April 2025.
Period At the time of the accident, 6 September 2026
Note Flight 7521 earlier that day was the first time the two had flown together. Experience figures describe the crew only; the NTSB has made no finding on them.
3none13:13 (special)162413:50 (5 min)172613:53 (METAR)
Wind speedGust

Wind at Miami before the landing

knots
Source NTSB preliminary report DCA26MA352 (Miami ASOS reports)
Scope Miami International Airport automated surface observations on 6 September 2026 (local time). The 13:13 report gave variable wind; the 13:50 and 13:53 reports gave winds from 190 degrees.
Period 13:13 to 13:53 local, 6 September 2026
Note The report also records a peak hourly wind of 26 kt from 180 degrees at 13:52 and thunderstorms reported at 13:13. The landing was on runway 30.

Speed stayed high from the threshold

The recorded groundspeed was 177 kt at the threshold and 160 kt at touchdown, and the aircraft left the paved surface at 113 kt. The cockpit voice recording shows the first officer cautioning that the aircraft was too fast about 1 minute 42 seconds before the end of the recording. NTSB preliminary report ↗

Experience on type is a contract question

The captain had about 150 hours on the 767 and the first officer about 800, and the two were flying together for the first time that day. The NTSB makes no finding on this. For a contract owner it prompts a simple question: what minimums and pairing rules apply to the crews flying your freight? NTSB preliminary report ↗

The wind changed in the hour before landing

Special and routine reports show a move from 3 kt variable at 13:13 to 16 kt gusting 24 kt at 13:50, with thunderstorms reported. The controller’s clearance to land did not include wind. NTSB preliminary report ↗

06

What to ask your operators

For the companies and BARS Member Organisations that contract aviation.

Crew briefing table with an approach chart and landing performance sheet (no readable text), storm clouds blurred in the window
Ask how crews turn changing wind into a go or no-go decision before they start the approach. (AI / illustrative only)

Questions a company or BARS Member Organisation can put to the operators it contracts, drawn from this month’s issue.

VERIFYDoes it work here, today?

Landing performance when the wind changes

When the wind shifts toward a tailwind in the last minutes of an approach, how does the crew recalculate landing distance, who calls it, and what triggers a go-around?

BARSCAO v11 · Control 5.7 Stabilized Approaches; 5.8 Mandatory Go-around Procedures
PRIORITISEWhat matters most?

Hours on type for new captains and crews

What minimum hours on type and what pairing rule apply to new captains and first officers on the aircraft that carry your freight, and who checks them?

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.4 Flight Crew Qualifications, Experience and Recency

Smoke and visibility on firefighting tasks

How are smoke, terrain and visibility limits set for bucket work in mountain valleys, and who can stop a drop task without penalty?

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.15 Operational Risk Assessment; Control 23.4 Standard Operating Procedures
CONTROLWhat keeps it working?

Forced-landing options over built-up areas

For single-engine helicopters flying news and event work over a city, how does the operator plan and brief forced-landing options and minimum heights?

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.15 Operational Risk Assessment; Control 5.9 Terrain Awareness Warning Systems
ASSUREIs it still working?

Seeing the flying, not just the paperwork

What flight data, tracking or sampling lets you, as the contract owner, see how crews actually fly your contract, not only what the procedures say?

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.13 Aircraft Operator SMS; Defence 19.5 Flight Following
07

Spotlight

Contracted flying: a small share of operators, a large share of what a brand or agency cannot see.

The name on the contract is not the name on the certificate. The risk lands on both.
Unmarked cargo containers on a wet apron at dusk sharp in the foreground, a freighter aircraft blurred behind
Ask who holds the contract, who holds the certificate, and what you can see of how the flying is done. (AI / illustrative only)

What we know and do not know. The NTSB has determined no cause for the Miami overrun, the Yosemite accident or the Chatsworth accident. The Miami preliminary report describes a fast, long landing in changing wind, a first-time crew pairing and a runway end with no arresting system. We draw no conclusion from that. The value for a risk owner is in the controls any contract owner would want around flying done for them.

Three accidents, three contracts. A cargo flight for a retailer, a firefighting contract and a television news arrangement look different, yet each had an operator flying for a named customer. In each the customer set tasks, schedules and sometimes performance terms. The contract owner usually sees the operator’s certificate and audit summary, not the day-to-day flying.

Experience and pairing are visible if you ask. The preliminary report records the captain’s hours on type and that the two pilots first flew together that day. Hours on type and crew pairing are simple to specify and to sample in a contract, and they sit alongside the operator’s own training and checking.

The edges of the airport belong to someone too. Five people on the ground died in a vehicle on a perimeter road near the runway end. Who controls vehicles near runway ends during landings, and what protects them, are airport questions a contract owner can still ask when they send heavy aircraft to a site.

Six controls to verify for contracted cargo, firefighting and helicopter work

Mapped to BARS (CAO v11) · SWA services
VERIFYDoes it work here, today?
PRIORITISEWhat matters most?
CONTROLWhat keeps it working?
ASSUREIs it still working?
1
VERIFY

Test landing performance and go-around discipline when the wind changes

When the wind moves toward a tailwind in the last minutes of an approach, who recalculates landing distance, what is the operator’s tailwind limit and what triggers a go-around? Ask for the procedure and for the last go-around reports from the airports you use.

BARSCAO v11 · Control 5.7 Stabilized Approaches; 5.8 Mandatory Go-around Procedures
SWAOperational reviews
2
PRIORITISE

Map the contracted flying you cannot see

List every flight flown for you by someone else, by task, aircraft type and site, then mark where you see only the certificate and the audit summary. Put assurance effort on the flying with the least visibility and the most severe outcome, such as heavy aircraft into airports with limited overrun protection.

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.15 Operational Risk Assessment; 1.13 Aircraft Operator SMS
SWAAviation exposure baseline and risk profile
3
CONTROL

Write crew experience and pairing minimums into the contract

Set minimum hours on type for new captains and first officers and a rule on pairing two new crew members, then check them against the crew records. Specify them in the contract rather than relying on the operator’s own policy.

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.4 Flight Crew Qualifications, Experience and Recency; 1.5 Flight Crew Check and Training
SWAOperator endorsement and contracting support
4
CONTROL

Check overrun protection and who controls the perimeter

For each airport your heavy aircraft use, confirm the runway-end safety area or arresting system, and who controls vehicles and people on perimeter roads during landings. Write the answer into the arrangement.

BARSCAO v11 · Control 2.3 Landing Site Assessments; 2.2 Airfield Inspections
SWAAerodrome, helipad and project aviation planning
5
ASSURE

See how crews actually fly your contract

Use flight data, tracking or sampling of approach stability and go-arounds on ordinary days, so you see the flying and not only the procedures. Act on the trends.

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.13 Aircraft Operator SMS; Defence 19.5 Flight Following
SWACritical control verification
6
ASSURE

Confirm directive close-out on contractor aircraft

For production-defect directives such as the A320-family gear support inspection, ask how the operator identifies affected serial numbers, confirms inspection and checks work done by third-party maintenance.

BARSCAO v11 · Control 10.10 Critical Maintenance Tasks and Independent Inspections
SWASpecialist aviation advisory

Critical controls that matter this month

Four of the five critical controls bear on this topic. Fuel does not feature this month.

Weather

The Miami preliminary report records a wind change in the hour before landing and a clearance without wind. Ask how crews get the wind at the time of landing and whether landing performance is recalculated when thunderstorms shift it.

BARSCAO v11 · Control 2.6 Destination Weather Reporting; Control 3.2 Flight Plan Weather Data
Personnel

The report records about 150 hours on type for the captain and a first-time pairing that day. Ask whether your contract sets hours-on-type and pairing rules, and sample six flights against the crew records.

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.4 Flight Crew Qualifications, Experience and Recency; Common Control 1.5 Flight Crew Check and Training
Infrastructure

Five people on a perimeter road died beyond the runway end. Ask whether the operator assessed overrun risk for its heaviest aircraft at each airport, and who controls vehicles near runway ends during landings.

BARSCAO v11 · Control 2.3 Landing Site Assessments; Control 2.2 Airfield Inspections
Aircraft

The Airbus directives trace to supplier production defects. Ask how the operator confirms affected serial numbers are inspected, including work by third-party maintenance.

BARSCAO v11 · Common Control 1.8 Basic Aircraft Equipment Fit; Control 10.10 Critical Maintenance Tasks and Independent Inspections
Close the loop

Inside your own organisation, make one person the owner of the operator’s performance and have them report go-arounds, tailwind landings, crew-pairing exceptions and airport overrun-risk findings to the executive and board who accepted the risk. Send the decisions back down to the logistics, procurement and site teams that set delivery schedules and choose airports, so a delivery deadline is never agreed without knowing the margin on the landing.

08

Looking ahead

Dates for the diary.

19 OctComment deadline on the FAA A320-family, A350-1041 and ATR 42-500 directives published 3 September. Airways summary ↗
20 OctFAA AD 2026-17-11 on the PC-24 windshield-heating relay takes effect. Federal Register ↗
20–22 OctNBAA Business Aviation Convention and Exhibition, Las Vegas. NBAA events ↗
10–12 NovInternational Air Safety Summit, ICAO headquarters, Montréal. FSF events ↗
09

What we've been up to

From the team, in one adviser's voice.

SWA this month

BARS standards work, MCAR development and steady client delivery.

Image to be supplied
Adviser photo: a landscape photo of you at work, or head and shoulders
Adviser photo [Adviser: add your photo here and replace this line with a short caption.]

September was a month of standards work and steady client delivery. We joined an online BARS TAC workshop and working-group sessions on the next version of a BARS standard, and kicked off the development project for our MCAR programme. The team kept up its fortnightly catch-up and regular aviation services meetings with an international resources client, and we scoped a helicopter external-load safety audit task for an infrastructure client. Internally we reviewed invoicing and job set-up with our accountants.

[Add your own comment on this month’s Spotlight section. Relate it to your past experience and highlight the relevant BARS clauses, critical controls and any recurring themes you see in the field.]

[Say where you have been this month and highlight a task or two (keep it non-specific). Summarise any interesting learnings, observations, recurring themes or outcomes. Finish on a positive reflection or suggestion.]

Geoff RobertsSenior Aviation Risk Advisor
Start the conversation

Questions about your aviation risk? Talk to us.

If something in this issue touches your operation, we are happy to talk it through — no obligation. Tell us the aircraft, the task and the contract, and we will tell you where we would look first.

Safety Wise International Pty Ltd · ABN 38 697 202 172
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General information only, not professional or legal advice. Safety Wise Aviation has taken care to verify the content from the sources cited, but does not warrant completeness or accuracy and accepts no liability for reliance on it. Investigations are ongoing in several events described; facts may change. Check the primary sources and your own regulator before acting.

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